What I’m about to post is hastily typed, put together, incomplete, and doesn’t actually take the form of an argument. That’s not what I want to provide, and really, I can’t provide that in a blog-format.
More importantly, I want to give the most amorphous hint of why it is that I align myself with the socialist project, why it matters from whose vantage point one is theorizing either capitalism or socialism, and to reveal even a glimpse of how rich and nuanced socialist democratic theory actually is.
I want to begin by laying out a few necessary provisions, with the hope that it becomes clear as we move forward that what I am putting forward is not the kind of defense that I would offer in a graduate seminar. Standard academic protocol requires that I offer a defense/critique by accepting the terms of the debate, if only provisionally and in the final instance for the sake of changing these terms. In this case, the terms of the debate are set by the vocabulary and concepts of Euro-Atlantic economic theories that tend to lend themselves as more or less universalizable categories of analysis.[1]
But, incidentally, I actually don’t think this is the kind of defense I want to offer here, that is, a diagnosis/critique of capitalism, and then offer a positivistic conceptual project to fill in the gap left by the critique. There are hundreds or thousands of books, just in the last decade, that do this just fine. I actually want to offer a more rhetorical defense of socialism, of why someone would elect to align themselves with a contemporary socialist project in light of the defeats of the Left in the last two centuries, and what socialists actually think capitalism is.
A methodological remark: It is absolutely necessary to delineate between a capitalist’s self-understanding of capitalism and socialism, and a socialist’s understanding of his or her own project and of capitalism. For most of us raised in capitalist societies, we’re taught that capitalism is essentially an economic phenomenon, a synchronic conceptual paradigm that gives to us both descriptive and normative traction on dealing with configurations and distributions of labor, commodities, goods, services, etc. etc. (Note: Some economists will, of course, intervene here: our theories are absolutely not synchronic, because we always take into consideration large time spans, changes in variable dependency over time, etc. etc. That is not a diachronic analysis. If you can reduce all spans of time into your system’s functions, conceptually, it is all the same time. The simultaneity of all events is created in economic analysis when the correspondence between different “time points” can be mapped into a single model or economic dynamic. This is why, for example, even though Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a philosophical history of all of time, it all happens at the same time, and that time is all compressed into the single rubric of eternity.)
A Brief Gloss of What a Socialist (me) Thinks Capitalism Actually Is:
So, capitalists (as far as I know) tend to construe both their own paradigm as well as socialism as competing economic paradigms (or moral paradigms essentially reducible to an economic paradigm). The metrics used to measure which of the two is a better paradigm invariably is internally generated from the capitalist paradigm itself, and then applied to socialism in order to show that socialism isn’t up to snuff to capitalism’s benchmarks. These include: efficiency, value, price, the vocabulary of private property, etc. etc. It’s essentially a tautological exercise, where the outcome of the comparison is essentially determined in advance by the (capitalist/economic) terms of the comparison.
Many socialists, in comparison, understand both capitalism and socialism to be competing historical/sociological paradigms. That is, while they do obviously involve economics, socialism and capitalism ultimately describe relations between subjects, their historicity, and the world. They are not (only) economic paradigms that normatively script the distribution of goods and services. Rather, they normatively script out each of our relations to the historical moment in which we live.
So, whereas Capitalism understands itself to be an optimized paradigm of determining the distribution of goods and services, Socialism understands Capitalism as a historical totality that maintains and reproduces itself through a series of abstractions and denial of human agency and freedom. The point I want to drive home is that the two do not view each other on the same terms. They are more akin to different optics: they each reveal and construct different ways of seeing human relations. To elaborate what a socialist might see capitalism as:
Totality: a synchronic, closed system where every element in the system can be articulated against another element by a function. And so, in a totality, there is no such thing as contingency, and thus no human agency (whose primary quality is bringing into the world contingency). Note for many political economists (Schumpeter, I’m looking at you): the moment that you can subsume contingency into an economic model or dynamic, it’s not contingency. That’s exactly what it means to subsume something into a totality: to deny its contingency in relation to the whole. Boring logical point, but it needed to be said.
Capitalism as a Historical Totality: Capitalism is a historical dynamic, first and foremost. To quote Claude Lefort, capitalism as theorized by Marx contains “an opposition…between the notions of continuity and discontinuity in history.”
…the idea of an ineluctable movement governed by the growth of productive forces, moving from one mode of production to another, on the one hand, and the idea of a radical break between all precapitalist modes of production and modern capitalism, on the other; or in other words, an opposition between the idea of a dissolution of all restricted social relations and the idea of a force of conservation, of mechanisms of repetition which, even in capitalism, seemed to ensure the permanence of a structure (Lefort, “The Image of the Body in Totalitarianism,” 294-295).
It has a genealogy. It maintains itself and reproduces itself through a series of abstractions (abstracting both time and space). Geographic space, human activity, and time itself become abstract constructs so that they can all become commensurable with one another. That is, one can in fact define the relationship between space, time, labor, and human life more generally by way of abstracting them and mediating them with the key category of: value. The abstraction of all things under capitalism lets one adequate qualitatively different things with the metric of value, and this is most obviously manifest in the commodity-form of money.
To sum a huge amount of theoretical elaboration, the point here is that capitalism maintains itself by making all things commensurable with one another, and so denies the qualitative specificity of human life in favor of adequating everything together under the abstracting paradigm of value and money. This is also how Capitalism maintains itself as a totality: everything can be subsumed under its paradigm because everything now expresses the abstract dimension of value, which makes everything definable in terms of another element in the totality. This makes the whole thing regularizable.
A Defense of Socialism for the Sake of Freedom:
No serious socialist decries Capitalism as a purely bad thing, since that treats it as a homogenous block without internally contradictory features while also failing to grasp its difficult historical emergence. But, for many reasons (which are too many for me to enumerate), socialists of all different stripes also find it problematic. My particular focus is on the problem of human freedom and historical contingency (this is why I’ve framed this post as it is).
How a capitalist often understands freedom: as liberum arbitrium, or the ability to choose between two pregiven options. This is obviously only one way of understanding freedom, and it is particularly specific to capitalism and is our inheritance from Christian theology (Paul and Augustine). As far as I’m concerned, that is not freedom. I align myself with people like Levinas and Arendt: freedom as the faculty of beginning, of the capacity to enter the public realm in concert with other people to bring into the world what could not have been foreseen, what could not have been foretold, an “infinite improbability.” Freedom is never a feature of one person; that doesn’t make any sense to me. I am “free” only insofar as I am free with my companions to bring something radically contingent into the world. Both Levinas and Arendt ground freedom/responsibility in natality and our ability to make promises: because we are born from a Mother, because we are born as an irreducibly unique individual who can never be reduced to a general theme of the world, we have the capacity to begin anew, to give birth to something and to keep it in the world by making promises with others, and to endure the essentially unpredictable future by keeping those promises with other people. (For Arendt, the promise is of political freedom; for Levinas, the promise is of responsibility and trust between essentially different people.)
As far as I’m concerned, in capitalism, that kind of freedom is barely possible. This is also why the socialist project has, since the 1960s, become aligned with the radical democracy project. Socialism has little to do with centralizing anything; rather, it is the democratization of state power, the creation of public spaces where dissensus and (peaceful) revolution can occur. It has to do with changing the relations between humans so that it is not (in the final instance) always mediated by the exchange of commodities or the abstract categories of value which, but to ask if there is another way of mediating human relations which engenders, and not subsumes, radical contingency.
There is obviously a problem: our understanding of capitalism is of a historical dynamic. This means that what we’re seeking isn’t to renew the world from a tabula rasa. Rather, we have to figure out how to internally create the possibilities of a post-Capitalist society within capitalism. And, at a high resolution (the historical vantage point of analysis), capitalism is fully deterministic. Many Marxists (but not me) do not believe in human agency; they think that as long as Capitalism is around, all human agency is illusory, an ideological rationalization of our human condition in this historical moment. Believing in agency is a failure of proper critical thought.
But I actually agree with Arendt and Weber: humans have the capacity to make miracles everyday, even against the obduracy of historical over-determinations. It’s obviously not easy, but the socialist political project is to figure out how, given the totalizing jurisdiction of capitalism today, we can cultivate a politics that can poke holes into the capitalist totality and introduce spaces for human freedom and responsibility.
In my own personal research, I do this by studying/critiquing contemporary forms of sovereignty.
“If men wish to be free, it is precisely sovereignty they must renounce.” (Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?”)
Sovereignty used to be theorized as the kind of power exercised by a King: the explicit control and regulation of the body politic by maintaining a monopoly on legitimate exercises of force and violence. But, as we now also know, that kind of sovereignty is a bit anachronistic in many parts of the world. Sovereignty now also takes the form of denying the essential contingency of the future by normatively scripting it in advance. It takes the form of establishing historically specific norms of human life, and then naturalizing those norms as if they are parts of an inexorable human condition. Sovereignty also seeks the binding of people and gathering all of history into a single Archimedean gaze; this is where capitalism becomes totalitarianism.
This more expansive vision of sovereignty works by naturalizing ways of seeing the world (naturalizing racial categories, naturalizing gender binaries, naturalizing a vision of what a human is: an interest-bearing subject who optimizes his own self-interests). So, the ultimate aim of a socialist project is, as Marx put it, “a ruthless criticism of everything existing” in order to denaturalize what we think the world has to be, for the sake of what we want the world to be (Arendt, Levinas, Marx).
I tend to think of the socialist project as essentially a project of collective promise-making: of engendering human freedom in the world, of altering the specificity of human relations so that they are not ensnared in the abstracting and reductive tendencies to Capitalism, to reveal human relations as irreducible sources of pleasure and life. Socialists generally are not so naive as to think that Capitalism can be swept away with a single gesture; but, I (as a self-identified socialist) also think that it absolutely incumbent on us, as political agents, to do the impossible, which is to say to alter the texture of the political realm (through teaching, through dialogue, through critique) in a way that makes it possible for a post-Capitalist society to emerge someday.
[1] By universalizable, I mean that all forms of economic analysis can be subsumed under Euro-Atlantic categories, either by extending and enlarging the particular concepts of conventional capitalist-economic theory or by reducing/abstracting away from human life in order to have it comport to the models generated by said theories. Ultimately, and I think this is pretty much uncontestable, capitalist economic theories (so nearly all economic theory, even “liberal” ones in the U.S.,) are premised on a very specific theory of human subjectivity which asserts itself as self-evident and natural even though its basic categories fail to obtain in practically any situation in which the resolution is small enough.
Filed under: Kevin Duong , Claude Lefort, freedom, hannah arendt, levinas, Max Weber, Socialism